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This paper evaluates quantitatively the potential welfare gains from monetary policy and fixed 
exchange rate rules in a two-country sticky-price model. The first finding is that the gains from 
stabilization tend to be small in the types of economic environments emphasized in recent 
theoretical literature.  The analysis goes on to identify two types of economies in which the 
welfare implications of risk are larger: where agents exhibit habits, and where international asset 
markets exhibit asymmetry in the form of “original sin.” In the habits case, monetary policy 
aimed solely at inflation stabilization is optimal. But in the original sin case there are potentially 
large welfare gains from also eliminating exchange rate volatility. 
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1   Introduction 
  Exchange rate variability is one of the most prominent features of open economy 
macroeconomics, and the tendency for nominal exchange rates to move so volatilely and 
unpredictably has been blamed for limiting gains from international trade and for lowering 
welfare. A desire to moderate this uncertainty has been a motivation behind the managed 
exchange rate regimes of many countries as well as European monetary union. This paper 
conducts a quantitative examination of the welfare effects of risk in the context of a two-
country general equilibrium model with sticky prices. It addresses two questions. Firstly, for 
what types of open economies does stabilization matter quantitatively for welfare? And 
secondly, under what circumstances is it optimal to focus policy on stabilizing the exchange 
rate in particular?  
  Several recent papers have employed analytically solvable models to investigate the 
welfare effects of exchange rate risk and the potential welfare benefits of exchange rate 
stabilization. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) demonstrated how micro-founded sticky price 
models could be extended to include risk premia, and thereby to trace out implications for 
overall economic activity and welfare. Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2000) demonstrated that 
exchange rate variability may be costly or beneficial depending on the nature of household 
preferences. Devereux and Engel (2003) showed that results depend on the currency of price 
stickiness.
1 
  This paper aims at a more quantitative analysis, as permitted by calibration and 
numerical solution. For example, asset markets and preferences are not limited here to cases 
of complete risk sharing, which allows us to explore the potentially important implications of 
exchange rate fluctuations working through the current account. This also allows us to 
explore reallocations of wealth between countries, which are potentially important for 
international welfare.  The paper evaluates a number of novel but empirically relevant asset 
structures and consumer preferences.  This numerical analysis is made possible by the 
second-order solution method developed in Kim et. al. (2004), which is also applied to an 
open economy setting in Kollmann (2002) and (2004).
2  The analysis here differs from 
                                                 
1 For a sample of other work looking at welfare analysis in micro-founded models, see Benigno (2004), 
Benigno and Benigno (2003), Carre and Collard (2003), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001), Corsetti and 
Pesenti (2001a,b), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), Sutherland (2005).  
 
2 Related solution algorithms have been proposed in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a), and Collard and 
Juillard (2001).    2 
Kollmann mainly in that it seeks out and studies economic environments where the welfare 
effects can be large.
3 
      The first finding of this quantitative analysis is to note that the wel fare effects of 
uncertainty and the gains from stabilization policy are all quite small in the context of the 
economic environments debated in recent theoretical literature. The second contribution is to 
identify two cases, not previously analyzed in this literature, where welfare effects appear to 
be larger. The first of these cases is where household preferences exhibit habits, and the 
second is where international asset markets are asymmetric so as to exhibit “original sin.” 
Under habits, households are by definition more sensitive to the risk of consumption 
variability. However, despite the larger welfare effects of risk in this case, the ability of 
policy rules to improve welfare remains small. Further, we find that it is not optimal for a 
policy rule in this environment to do anything to diminish exchange rate volatility.  
  The second case where the welfare effects of risk are larger is where one country is 
unable to issue debt denominated in its own currency. Termed “original sin” in recent 
literature, this asset asymmetry makes it difficult for the country to hedge against risk by 
saving, since net foreign assets expose the country to greater exchange rate risk. As a result 
there is a lower level of saving. In this context it can be welfare improving for this country to 
use monetary policy to stabilize the exchange rate.  
  The next section of the paper presents the two-country model, calibration, and 
solution method. Section 3 presents results for a range of cases for this model. Section 4 
concludes and makes suggestions for future research. 
 
2 The Model 
  Consider a model of two countries, denoted home and foreign. Agents consume two 
final goods, where each country specializes in the production of one of these. 
Monopolistically competitive firms produce intermediates using capital and labor, and set 
prices sluggishly due to adjustment costs. 
 
2.1   Goods market structure   
                                                 
3 The analysis here also differs from Kollmann in that it presents conditional welfare analysis.  
   3 
  Final goods (F) are a CES index over sub-indexes of the home (FH) and foreign (FF) 
intermediates. The aggregation technology for final goods is: 
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where a lower case represents output of the individual firms. 
  Final goods producers behave competitively, maximizing profit each period: 
  [ ] F P S F P F P t F t F t H t H t t t t , , , , max - - = P ,                                             (4)      
where P is the overall price index of the final good, PH is the price index of home goods in 
home currency units, and PF of foreign goods in foreign currency units. S is the nominal 
exchange rate, home currency units per foreign. The price indexes may be defined: 
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Given the aggregation functions above, demand will be allocated between home and foreign 
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Analogous definitions apply to the foreign country. 
 
2.2  Home household problem  
  The representative home household derives utility from consumption (C), real money 
balances (M/P), and labor (H). Households derive income by selling their labor (H) at the 
nominal wage rate (W), renting out capital to firms at the real rental rate (r), receiving real 
profits from home firms (? ), and from government transfers (T). In addition to money, 
households can hold a noncontingent nominal bond denominated in home currency (BH)   4 
which pays an interest rate (i), or a bond denominated in foreign currency (BF) which pays an 
interest rate (i*). The household determines capital accumulation (K), which involves a 
quadratic adjustment cost that depends upon the parameter ? I and a constant rate of 
depreciation (d). 
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Money demand shocks are represented by shifts in ?t. There is a small adjustment cost on 
bond holdings, ACB, to ensure stationarity in the net foreign asset position.
4 Later sections of 
the paper will consider more general forms of preferences than those here, including habits. 
Later sections will also consider alternative asset market structures, such as that limited to 
only one type of bond. 
  Optimization implies a money demand equation: 
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a trade-off between consumption and leisure:  
                                                 
4 Home and foreign bonds are treated separately in this adjustment cost to ensure that there exists a 
determinate allocation between home and foreign currency bonds even in a first-order approximation to the 
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equating the benefits and costs of capital accumulation. 
 
2.3  Home firm problem   
  The benchmark version of the model assumes producer currency pricing, so that 
firms set prices in thei r own currency both for sales domestically and sales abroad. They rent 
capital (K) at the rental rate r, and hire labor (H) at the nominal rate W. Prices are sticky 
because there is a quadratic cost to adjusting them. The home firm maximization problem for 
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with the adjustment and marginal costs defined respectively as:  
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and subject to the demand function for fH,t(i) from above and the production function 
specifying output (y(i)) as: 
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Here ? represents technology common to all production firms in the country, and is subject to 
shocks. Lastly, ? t,t+n is the pricing kernel used to value random date t+n payoffs. Since firms 
are owned by the representative household, they are assumed to value future profits 
according to the household's intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption, so 
( ) ( ) P U P U t t C n t n t C
n
n t t ' ' , , , + + + = b x .  
  The optimization problem implies a trade-off between capital and labor inputs that 
depend on the relative cost of each: 
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and price setting behavior: 
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  Note that in the special case of no price stickiness (?P=0), price-setting is set as a 




l . But in the presence of price adjustment 
costs, price-setting will deviate from this simple markup because of several additional terms. 
First, the resource cost of setting a price (ACP) should be included along with the cost of 
production when computing the overall price of bringing a good to market. The next term in 
the expression above reflects the backward looking component of price setting: firms are 
reluctant to make large changes in price due to the marginal adjustment cost. The final term 
reflects the forward-looking component of price setting. If a firm expects the need to change 
prices further in the next period, it will tend to change the price more today, to minimize 
future adjustment costs. Further, there is an additional reason to raise prices today, because a   7 
higher current price means that any future changes will be a smaller percentage change. Here 
we see one reason for the monopolist to set a higher price on average, as a hedge against 
future price changes. 
  Note that in the symmetric equilibrium  ( ) P p t H t H i
, , = . 
 
2.4  Government 
  Model  experiments will consider three alternative types of policy rules. The first two 
simple rules can be summarized in the following money growth rule:  
) ( 1 s s a m m t s t t - + = -                                                  (27) 
where the response parameter aS characterizes the degree to which money supply is adjusted 
to stabilize the nominal exchange rate at a target level. (Lower case indicates logs.) First, as a 
benchmark for later comparisons we consider aS near zero, which we refer to as a “no policy” 
case, since monetary policy is not responding to the exchange rate or any other endogenous 
variables or exogenous shocks.
5 The general money supply rule in (28) also can encompass a 
fixed exchange rate regime, for as set to a large negative value. So a simple bilateral fixed 
exchange rate rule will be the second case considered in experiments.
6  
  Finally, to relate to recent research on optimal policy rules, we also consider a 
Taylor-type interest rate setting rule 
S Y i i t s t y t t ˆ ˆ G + G + G + = p p                                              (28) 
where i is steady state interest rate, p t is inflation rate,  Y Y Y Y t t t / ) ( ˆ 1 - - = is output gap, 
St ˆ is  percentage changes in the nominal exchange rate. We assume that central banks make a 
commitment to set these parameters at time-invariant values. 
  The government's budget constraint is: 
M M T t t t 1 - - =                                                  (29) 
 
2.5  Market clearing and equilibrium 
  Market clearing for the home goods market requires: 
                                                 
5 Setting as=-10
-6 is sufficient to maintain stationarity of the exchange rate here, which allows us to analyze 
this key variable in nominal form in the model solution. 
6 For the foreign country’s rule, the response coefficient to the exchange rate is the negative of that for the 
home country.   8 
Y F F t t H t H = + *
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and for the home bond market: 
0 * = +B B Ht Ht .                                                      (31) 
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The home balance of payments condition may be written: 
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  Equilibrium is a set of 37 sequences:  , , , , , ,
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i i M M t t t t  The 37 equilibrium conditions are:  the definition of total demand (1), demand 
conditions for home and foreign goods (8 and 9), the overall price index (5), the price setting 
rule (26), the money supply rule (27 or 28), labor supply condition (15), capital-labor trade-
off (25), money demand condition (14), the interest rate parity condition (18), production 
function (24), definition of marginal cost (23),definition of total demand (32), definition of d 
(17), consumption Euler equation (16), market clearing conditions for goods (30) and bonds 
(31), capital accumulation (19), along with foreign counterparts for each of the above and the 
balance of payments constraint (33). 
  The shocks, to technology and money demand in each country, will be log-normally 
distributed: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) e c c r c c
e c c r c c
e q q r q q

















* log log * log log
log log log log
* log log * log log





+ - = -
+ - = -
+ - = -





                               (34) 
) , 0 ( ~ ] , , [ *
2 2
*
, 1 1 S ¢ N t t t t e e e e . 
  To deal with the nonstationary nominal variables in this system, they will be 
transformed by dividing by their respective national price level. As noted above, this does not 
need to be done for the nominal exchange rate. 
 
   9 
2.6  Solution method and welfare computation 
  The model is solved numerically to a second order approximation.  See Kim et. al . 
(2003) or Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) for a detailed explanation of the methodology. 
This contrasts with the more standard method relying upon log-linear approximations of 
model equations, which would only capture the direct effects of exchange rate variability on 
welfare through the fact that people dislike variance in consumption and leisure. A second 
order approximation to the full set of model equations additionally picks up the effects of 
variability on welfare through the means of consumption and leisure. For example, firms may 
hedge against exchange rate variability by setting higher prices and lowering mean output, 
and households may engage in precautionary saving that affects mean consumption. 
  We report welfare analysis both in conditional and unconditional terms. In either case, 
welfare is based on a second order Taylor expansion of the utility function around the 
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The unconditional welfare loss is measured in terms of the share (u) of deterministic steady 
state consumption the household would be willing to give up to eliminate risk; that is, which 
equates the utility level of the determinist steady state and the unconditional expectation 
under uncertainty defined above:  
( ) ( ) ( ) t t H C EU H C u U , , 1 = + . 
This welfare effect can be decomposed into the part due to the variance of uncertain 
consumption and leisure, and the part due to the effect of uncertainty on the means of these 
variables: 
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  We also report conditional welfare measures, which have the advantage of taking into 
consideration the transition dynamics following the implementation of a new policy rule. To 
compare the welfare implications of adopting the set of alternative policy rules, we trace out 
the utility level of the economy as it starts out from the unconditional expectation implied by 
the ‘no policy’ rule defined above, and evolves over time in response to the alternative rule 
under consideration. Welfare is summarized analogously to the unconditional formulas above,   10 
except that it is the discounted sum of expected utilities over time rather than the 
unconditional expectation that is reported. For example, the overall welfare effect is 
computed:  





, ) 1 ( , 1
t
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t l conditiona H C U E H C u U b b . 
  To solve for the reaction parameters in the policy rule (28) that are optimal in terms 
of welfare, a grid search is conducted to maximize the world (sum of home and foreign) 
welfare level . We do this in turn for both conditional and unconditional welfare measures, as 
defined above, though for our cases the optimal policy parameters are unaffected.  Since the 
benchmark case is symmetric, this is a fairly simple matter of choosing three policy 
parameters, G ?, G y and G e, which we accomplish by grid search.
7 (We also consider an 
alternative non-cooperative policy for the nonsymmetric case in the paper’s final 
experiment, discussed below.) 
 
2.7  Calibration 
  We follow Bergin and Feenstra (2001) in setting e = ? = 4, implying an interest 
elasticity of real money balances of 0.25 and an income elasticity of unity. We follow 
estimates of the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods Harrigan (1993) 
and Trefler and Lai (1999) in setting µ=5. A value of ? =7 implies an average price mark-up 
of 16%. The share of home goods in the home final goods aggregator, a, is set at 0.80, 
reflecting the 20% share of imports in GDP on average for the G7 countries in the 1990:1-
1998:4 period. 
   We follow Christiano at. al. (1997) in setting the labor supply at unity (?=1). ß=0.99, 
where a period in the model is one quarter. For the depreciation rate we choose d=0.025, and 
for the capital share in production a=0.36. 
  The price adjustment cost is set at ?P=50, which implies that 95% of the price has 
adjusted 4 periods after a monetary shock. Investment adjustment cost, ? I=4, is calibrated 
such that investment is about three times more volatile than output. Bond adjustment cost, 
?B=0.000004, is necessary in order to negate the unit root associated with the incompleteness 
                                                 
7 For G? , we searched over a grid from 1 to 5 with a step of 0.25.  For Gy, from 0 to 5 with a step of 0.25.  
The response to the exchange rate , Ge, was bounded above 10
-4 to prevent nonstationarity of the exchange 
rate. We considered bigger values for Ge, but it did not make welfare improve for the benchmark or other 
symmetric cases of the model.   11 
of the asset markets. We set lower bounds on the monetary policy reaction parameters to the 
exchange rate (aS= 10
-6 ) in order to eliminate the unit root in the monetary policy rule. It is 
crucial that the first-order solution does not contain unit roots, because, otherwise, in the 
second-order solution the variances of the variables will grow to infinity. 
   The variance and persistence of the technology shock is calibrated at standard values: 
01 . ) var( ) var( 2 *
1 1 = = e e  and  90 . 0
*
1 1 = = r r , common values in the real business cycle 
literature and identical to Kollmann (2002). As will be seen in Table 1, these values help us 
to replicate the second moments of output, which we compute to be 1.80 for the 1973:1-
2000:4 period in HP-filtered GDP data for the G7 countries on average. 
  Money demand shocks are calibrated to help replicate the observed second moments 
of the nominal exchange rate. While the search for an adequate theoretical explanation for 
exchange rate volatility is itself the subject of ongoing research, the approach taken here 
follows on the example of the literature discussed in the introduction; Devereux and Engel 
(2003), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000), and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) each use money 
demand or money supply shocks to generate exchange rate variability. Bergin (2003) offers 
some empirical support for this approach. We compute the bilateral exchange rate with the 
U.S. dollar of the remaining G7 countries on average to be 7.81 percent for HP-filtered data 
in the 1973:1 - 2000:4 period, which is between 4 and 5 times as volatile as output. The 
autoregressive coefficient indicated by this data is 0.79. Replicating these features requires 
the following values for the money demand shocks:  03 . ) var( ) var( 2 *
1 1 = = e e  and 
99 . 0
*
1 1 = = r r . For simplicity we assume that shocks are uncorrelated with each other. 
 
3  Results 
3.1  Benchmark case 
  Column 1 of Table 1 reports results for the benchmark specification of the model 
under the “no-policy” case. First note that the standard deviations of the key variables in the 
model match fairly well with the average among G7 economies. Consumption is about 1/2 as 
volatile as output, investment is more than 2 times as volatile, and the nominal exchange rate 
is about 4 times as volatile as output.  
  The next set of entries in column 1 show the effects that risk have on the means of 
key endogenous variables, measured as the percent difference between the unconditional   12 
mean of the second-order solution and the deterministic steady state. The level of production 
is lower under the presence of risk, with consumption likewise lower and leisure higher. This 
in part is due to the higher markup of the home goods price over marginal cost shown in the 
table. Note also that the trade volume is higher under the presence of risk, a possibility raised 
theoretically by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000). 
  The bottom set of entries in column 1 indicates that these effects of risk translate into 
lower welfare, about a third of which come from the shift in means noted above. But the 
magnitudes of these welfare effects are fairly small, amounting to a fall in utility equal to 
0.14% of steady state consumption. A useful comparison is the result of Lucas (1987), which 
measured the effect on welfare of volatility arising from business cycle fluctuations. Finding 
a loss equivalent to a drop in average consumption by 0.042 percent, he concluded that this 
was a trivial magnitude. The result here is somewhat larger, but still of a similar order of 
magnitude and far below one percent of steady state consumption. 
  How can stabilization policies improve welfare in this context? Column 2 of Table 1 
shows that the simple fixed exchange rate rule does eliminate part of the welfare loss from 
the “no-policy” case. Column 3 shows that welfare can be improved yet further with an 
optimized interest rate setting rule. The optimal rule in this case is to put weight only on 
inflation targeting (G ? =5.0), with no effort to stabilize output or the exchange rate (G Y=0.0, 
G S=0.0001).
8  The conditional welfare analysis leads to the same optimal policy grid values 
and the same ranking of policy rules in the table. The welfare time paths for each regime for 
the benchmark case are depicted in Figure 1.   
  It is perhaps obvious that an optimal rule dominates the fixed exchange rate rule, 
since the choice set for the optimal rule nests a fixed exchange rate as one possibility (large 
G S). More informative is the fact that the optimal rule places no more than the minimum 
required weight on exchange rate stabilization, instead placing all weight on the inflation 
term. Furthermore, the optimal rule actually raises the unconditional volatility of the 
exchange rate relative to the no-policy case. This may reflect the use of exchange rate 
movements to facilitate adjustment to real shocks, in place of prices which cannot adjust due 
to stickiness. These findings lead to our first significant result: exchange rate volatility per se 
does not seem to be harmful to welfare in the benchmark environment. 
                                                 
8 As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b) we found that the inflation parameter is at the upper bound of the 
range considered in the grid search. Allowing yet higher values of this parameter appears to have negligible 
effects on the equilibrium.    13 
  The second significant conclusion is that the welfare benefits of optimal stabilization 
policy rules are very small. The gains relative to the no-policy case are 0.074 percent of 
consumption for unconditional measures and only 0.035 percent for unconditional. We might 
have been able to surmise this conclusion from the small welfare numbers in column 1 
discussed above. If there is little loss from variability, then there is little opportunity for 
stabilization policy to raise welfare by stabilizing this variability.  
 
3.2  Standard cases from the literature and sensitivity analysis 
  This section evaluates some of the controversies raised in the theoretical literature, 
regarding the impact of alternative economic environments and the implications for policy 
choices. Given the conclusions of the preceding paragraph and the difficulty of solving for 
optimal policy rules, we limit ourselves in this section to discuss unconditional deviations 
from deterministic steady state.  
  It has been demonstrated in an analytically solvable model that price stickiness in the 
local currency of the buyer (LCP) can alter the welfare effects of flexible exchange rates 
(Devereux and Engel, 2003). Column 1 of Table 2 indicates that having price stickiness of 
some type indeed is important to the results here. A case with no price stickiness cuts in half 
the welfare loss of risk, and this mainly works by fully eliminating the extra markup in price-
setting behavior attributable to risk, which now takes a zero value in the table. But column 2 
indicates that LCP stickiness seems not to be a quantitatively significant distinction here. The 
welfare effect of risk remains small, and is even a bit smaller than under the PCP benchmark 
specification.  
  It has also been demonstrated that the substitutability between consumption and 
leisure in preferences can switch the effects of exchange rate variability from negative to 
positive (Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2000). We address this issue by replacing the utility 
function in (12) with one that resembles that of Bacchetta and van Wincoop:
9 
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9 This utility differs from Bachetta and van Wincoop (2000) in that it includes money. Note that this utility 
differs from that used earlier in the paper in the way it includes labor, so that it does not collapse down to 
equation (12) if we assume a zero elasticity of substitution. Also note that the change in utility function 
requires a corresponding adjustment in the computation of u
mean and u
var in evaluating welfare effects.   14 
The parameter b is calibrated so that the steady state share of time to labor is 0.37, and f  is 
adjusted to replicate the consumption-leisure substitutabilities considered in Bacchetta and 
van Wincoop, so f  is set at 0.1 and 10 for complements and substitutes respectively. Our 
model may be viewed as a generalization of theirs to include dynamics, technology shocks, 
and investment. See columns 3 and 4 in Table 2 for results. Confirming their results, risk 
raises trade volume when consumption and leisure are complements, and it lowers trade 
volume when they are substitutes. Further, welfare is worse under substitutes than under 
complements, though the welfare effects are negative for both cases in our model. But while 
the effects in general resemble those of the earlier paper in a qualitative sense, once again the 
main conclusion is that in a quantitative sense, the present model reveals that these effects are 
all quite small. 
  We consider some parameter values that might be expected to raise the magnitude of 
the small welfare effects found above. One possibility is that exchange rate variability would 
matter more for countries that trade more with foreign countries. Column 5 shows a case 
where the share of imports in GDP (1-a) is raised from 0.2 to 0.5. This makes little difference. 
It is also possible that risk would matter if agents were more risk averse. Column 6 shows a 
case where the risk aversion parameter (?) is set at 30 instead of 4. Again there is little effect. 
It appears that a wide range of cases of the two-country model imply that the welfare effects 
of risk are quantitatively small. 
 
3.3  Habits 
  Past research on household responses toward risk in terms of consumption and asset 
choices has found that habits may be an essential part of household preferences.
 10 Given that 
this literature has found households to be quite sensitive to risk in domestic equity markets, 
one might also expect them to be sensitive to risk in international asset markets. Yet papers 
analyzing the effects of exchange rate risk to date have not been able to consider this 
potentially important feature because it precludes the usual analytical solution.  






























t t t t
t ,                                   (46) 
                                                 
10 See for example Constantinides (1990) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) regarding the equity 
premium puzzle, and see Deaton (1987) and Fuhrer (2000) for a discussion in the context of consumption 
behavior.   15 
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As ? goes to unity, households act to smooth changes in consumption rather than the level of 
consumption. We calibrate the habit persistence parameter at ?=0.8, which is approximately 
what Deaton (1987) and Constantinides (1990) require in order to explain aggregate 
consumption smoothness and the equity premium puzzle. 
  While it is common in calibrating habit persistence models to impose a large 
investment adjustment cost to keep the standard deviation of consumption from falling to 
implausibly low levels, this device does not work in an open economy where international 
borrowing breaks the link between domestic investment and saving. Instead we augment the 
bond adjustment cost in the household budget constraint to penalize large changes in asset 
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where ?B2 is calibrated at 0.0009. 
  Column 1 of Table 3 shows that welfare in the no-policy case does now fall a 
somewhat larger amount due to risk. In particular, households would be willing to trade 
0.66% of annual steady state consumption to eliminate this risk.
12 We conclude that in 
comparison to LCP and leisure substitutability and the other features considered in the 
analytical literature, habits appear to be a quantitatively somewhat more interesting object of 
study in terms of the implications for welfare. 
  However, despite the fact that risk has larger welfare effects here, Table 3 shows that 
habits do not much affect the optimal policy rule, and that stabilization policy continues to 
have small effects on the level of welfare. The optimal policy parameters are the same as in 
the benchmark case, still with minimal weight on the exchange rate. And it again is true that 
exchange rate variability is increased by the optimal rule. Welfare is improved by only 0.130 
percent in unconditional terms, and 0.023 percent in conditional terms. While habits indicate 
                                                 
11 The welfare formula is of course updated with the second order expansion of the new utility function. 
12 Note that with a different utility function, the formulas for computing u
mean and u
var must be altered 
accordingly. We note also that as the effects of risk become larger, there is a greater chance that the second 
order solution method may run into accuracy problems.   16 
that households are more concerned about smoothing their consumption stream, it appears 
that monetary policy has minimal impact on this particular source of risk in the model . 
 
3.4  Original sin in asset markets 
  Welfare implications can be shaped also by the structure of a country's asset market. 
Eichengreen, et.al. (2003) have noted that perceptions in the international capital market 
make it impossible for many countries to issue international debt denominated in their own 
national currency. Given that such perceptions of untrustworthiness may well be beyond the 
control of the country to change, but simply are a feature of the international capital market, 
the authors have termed this condition 'original sin.' 
  To explore this feature, consider a version of our model where there is only one 
nominal bond that is traded internationally, denominated in the currency of the home country. 
This implies the benchmark model above, except that BFt is set to zero in all periods. The 
home country in our model certainly is relevant for those countries whose currencies have the 
status of reserve currencies, such as the U.S., Japan, and EMU countries. And the foreign 
country in the model is relevant to some degree for any of the remaining countries, and most 
especially for developing countries. 
  Looking at the first column of Table 4, this asymmetry in asset markets implies that 
risk has a significant impact on welfare of the two countries.
13 While the foreign country's 
welfare is hurt by the presence of risk, the home country actually benefits. The magnitude of 
the effect on the foreign country is even larger than that in the habits case above. Table 4 
indicates that the large majority of this effect comes from a change in the mean value of 
variables rather than the variances. In particular there is a rise in the mean of home 
consumption and a fall in foreign. Clearly the asymmetry of this result distinguishes it from 
the analytical models with perfect risk sharing common in the literature. 
  The logic for what happens in this case of asymmetric incomplete markets is as 
follows. The introduction of risk makes households want to engage in precautionary saving to 
hedge. But since this is true for both countries, the main effect is to make the world interest 
rate on the bond fall, as can be seen clearly in column 1 of Table 4. Since the international 
asset is in the currency of the home country, the exchange rate risk makes it a less attractive 
instrument for saving for the foreign country than for the home country. Given the fall in the 
                                                 
13 For the model to continue producing the same level of exchange rate variability under this specification, 
the variance of the money demand shock needed to be increased somewhat from 0.03² to 0.05².   17 
interest rate, the foreign country chooses to save less in equilibrium, while the home country 
saves more, also seen in the table. So the home country has greater wealth and hence greater 
consumption in steady state than the foreign country.
14 See the appendix for a more detailed 
derivation of these points. 
  Column 2 shows that the simple fixed exchange rate rule does lead to large changes 
in unconditional welfare, eliminating about half of the large welfare loss of the foreign 
country discussed above.
15  Column 3 shows that in a cooperative optimal policy regime 
there again is no effort to stabilize the exchange rate.
16 But a cooperative policy experiment 
may not be appropriate here, since summing the utilities over home and foreign households 
cancels out the large asymmetric welfare effects found above. Iterating to compute a full 
Nash policy equilibrium is prohibitive here, especially due to asymmetry. But as a final 
experiment (column 4), we compute the optimal policy rule for the foreign (sin) country, in a 
case where the home country policy is assumed to be committed to an inflation targeting rule. 
In this case the foreign country would choose a policy rule with substantial weight on the 
exchange rate (GS=0.5), and this does virtually eliminate exchange rate variability.
17 We think 
this experiment is informative, indicating that there are potentially large welfare gains for 
some types of countries from adopting policies that stabilize the exchange rate. It is 
economies of this type that may most warrant further investigation in the theoretical literature. 
 
4  Conclusions 
  This paper has investigated quantitatively the welfare effects of risk in a two-country 
sticky price model, as well as the potential welfare gains from fixed exchange rates and other 
                                                 
14 This result helps us to better understand and qualify the result in the small open economy model of 
Kollmann (2002). Because the model is of a small open economy, the world interest rate is taken as 
exogenous and is therefore unaffected by the presence of risk. As a result, the small country saves more and 
ends up with higher welfare in steady state. Our analysis shows that when a two-country model takes into 
consideration the effects of risk on the world environment, the resulting fall in interest rate reverses this 
result. 
15 Note also that the conditional welfare effect is small despite the large unconditional effect. Adopting a 
new policy does not change the fact that the foreign economy is starting off with a low share of wealth. 
After the adoption of the new policy, the foreign country begins saving more, but this entails a lower 
consumption level during the lengthy transition period where it is building up its capital stock and assets. 
16 The full policy rules are  4.50.00.0001ˆ ˆ tt t t ii YS p =+++  for the foreign (sin) country, and 
2.750.00.0001ˆ ˆ tt t t ii YS p =+++  for the home country. 
17 The full policy rules are  S Y i i t t t t ˆ ˆ 5 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 5 + + + = p  for the foreign (sin) country, with the home country 
policy fixed at  S Y i i t t t t ˆ 0001 . 0 ˆ 0 . 0 0 . 5 + + + = p , which was the optimum from the benchmark case.   18 
policy rules. The paper takes advantage of developments in solving second-order 
approximations to dynamic stochastic models, to investigate a plausibly calibrated and fairly 
richly specified model. The first finding is that in a standard economic environment, the 
welfare effects are likely to be quite small. Accordingly, the welfare gains from fixed 
exchange rates or optimal interest rate setting rules are likewise found to me small. In 
particular, there appears to be no positive gain in such a setting from stabilizing exchange 
rates per se. The finding of small quantitative implications appears to be true also for the set 
of economic features that have been the focus in recent theoretical research, including local 
currency pricing and consumption-leisure complementarity. 
  However, we identify two other types of economies where risk may have larger 
quantitative implications. The first is where agents exhibit habits, so that volatility in the 
consumption stream matters more to them. However, while risk affects these agents more, we 
find that this has little implication for policy. The optimal policy parameters are little affected 
by habits, and it remains true that policy rules here have little ability to improve welfare. 
  Finally, we find that economies characterized by original sin, unable to 
internationally sell debt denominated in their domestic currency, can be strongly affected by 
exchange rate risk. In contrast to the earlier cases, such a country potentially can improve 
welfare significantly by adopting a fixed exchange rate or by adopting an interest-rate setting 
policy rule that stabilizes the exchange rate as well as inflation. 
  This research leads us to believe that it would be useful for the literature to focus 
greater attention on the particular cases identified here as quantitatively significant for 
welfare. In particular, there is a need for theory to shed light on the various implications of 
original sin in asset markets. 
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 6 Appendix: Asymmetric Asset Market Case 
    One can gain some insight into the mechanism described in the text for the asymmetric 
assets markets case by comparing the intertemporal Euler equations across countries. The 
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    A bar over a variable denotes its deterministic steady state. The consumption Euler for the 
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(50) yields: 
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    A second-order Taylor expansion of (51) gives: 
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- - =               (52) 
A hat over a variable denotes a log deviation from its deterministic steady state. Since bonds 
are assumed to be zero in steady state,  h dB t
*  stands for the absolute deviation of bond 
holdings from zero. The last expression is crucial in our analysis because it demonstrates the 
relationship between the expected holdings of home bonds by the foreign country and the 
variability of the exchange rate.
18 This can be seen more clearly by further expanding  q
f
t  
                                                 
18 Note that among the three terms on the right hand side of the equality, the last term will be quantitatively 
insignificant in comparison with the others, as it is scaled by the adjustment cost parameter, ?_{B}, which 
is calibrated to be very small.   22 
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where we have made use of the fact that the unconditional expectations of  St ˆ  and  St ˆ 1 + , and 
qt ˆ
* and  q
h
t ˆ  are the same. Looking at (53) it is clear that an increase in the variance of the 
exchange rate in isolation would tend to make the foreign country save more by investing in 
the home-currency bond. This is so because the variability of the exchange rate makes the 
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution regarding foreign currency  q
f
t ˆ  higher. Moreover, 
it is always true that ( ) 0 ) ˆ , ˆ cov( ) ˆ var( 1 > - + S S S t t t since 
) ˆ var( ) ˆ var( 1 S S t t + = var(S_{t})=var(S_{t+1}). If this were the whole effect then we could 
have safely concluded that in the true (stochastic) steady state, the foreign holdings of home-
currency denominated bonds are positive. However, the covariance terms at the end of the 
expression alter this result. In particular,  ) ˆ , ˆ cov(
* q S t t  and  ) ˆ , ˆ cov(
*
1 1 q S t t + +  are both negative, 
where the first of these covariances dominates due to the stationarity of the model. Further, 
this covariance is sufficiently negative that it makes the overall expression 




































= =  which is the ratio of 
the marginal utility of consumption between periods (t+1) and t. Therefore, one could 
interpret the covariances between that ratio and the exchange rate as a risk premium 
associated with the investing in a foreign currency. As a result of this risk premium, the 
foreign agent's desire to save is less than that of the home agent, and the stochastic steady 
state implies a net foreign debt for the foreign country.   23 
 
Table 1: Benchmark Cases 
 
     No Monetary    Fixed    Optimized Flexible 
    Policy    Exchange Rate    Exchange. Rate
3 
Standard deviations:          
 consumption    1.24    1.21    1.20 
 output    2.41    2.36    1.86 
 investment    5.09    5.09    4.93 
 inflation    0.70    0.48    0.02 
 exchange rate    8.03    0.00    20.07 
          
Stochastic steady state deviations
1:       
 consumption    -0.036    -0.018    0.016 
 leisure    0.012    0.017    0.026 
 output    -0.015    0.007    0.046 
 capital stock    -0.034    0.023    0.108 
 interest rate    -1.481    -1.082    -0.324 
 markup ratio    0.341    0.215    0.001 
 net foreign assets    0.000    0.000    0.000 
 trade volume    0.299    0.256    0.277 
          
Unconditional Welfare effects (as percentage of 
steady state consumption)
2: 
 u-overall    -0.144    -0.113    -0.070 
 u-variance    -0.099    -0.082    -0.067 
 u-mean    -0.046    -0.031    -0.003 
          
Conditional Welfare effects (as percentage of 
steady state consumption)
2: 
 u-overall    -0.144    -0.129    -0.109 
 u-variance    -0.099    -0.087    -0.070 
 u-mean    -0.046    -0.042    -0.039 
1 Percent difference between stochastic steady state and deterministic steady state. 
2 Difference between stochastic steady state and deterministic steady state, shown as a share of 
deterministic steady state consumption. 
Foreign variables are identical to hom e in the cases shown here.  
3 Flexible exchange rate regime with an optimal policy rule ( S Y i i t t t t ˆ 0001 . 0 ˆ 0 . 0 0 . 5 + + + = p ).  24 
Table 2: Standard Cases 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Flexible  LCP  Cons.-Leis.  Cons.-Leis.  Higher  Higher 
  Prices    Complements  Substitutes  Import share  Risk Aversion 
Standard deviations:             
 consumption  1.22  1.04  1.06  2.41  1.25  0.20 
 output  1.37  3.91  3.45  3.12  4.17  4.78 
 investment  5.00  6.16  5.78  6.87  4.66  5.82 
 exchange rate  7.45  9.16  8.03  8.01  8.05  8.02 
             
Stochastic steady state deviations
1:         
 consumption  0.016  -0.053  -0.032  0.017  -0.036  -0.006 
 leisure  0.035  -0.025  -0.022  0.082  0.006  0.054 
 output  0.055  -0.041  -0.040  0.062  -0.029  0.029 
 capital stock  0.118  -0.014  -0.070  0.276  -0.062  0.051 
 interest rate  -0.031  -0.103  -0.018  -0.119  -0.051  -0.051 
 markup ratio  0.000  0.214  0.652  0.391  0.316  0.370 
 net foreign assets  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 trade volume  0.293  0.488  1.183  -0.037  0.068  0.279 
             
Welfare effects (as percentage of steady state consumption)
2:       
 u-overall  -0.078  -0.090  -0.181  -0.242  -0.133  -0.147 
 u-variance  -0.071  -0.056  -0.174  -0.202  -0.092  -0.101 
 u-mean  -0.008  -0.035  -0.007  -0.039  -0.041  -0.048 
1 Percent difference between stochastic steady state and deterministic steady state. 
2 Difference between stochastic steady state and deterministic steady state, shown as a share of 
deterministic steady state consumption. 
Foreign variables are identical to home in the cases shown here.   25 
Table 3: Habit Persistence Cases 
 
     No Monetary    Fixed    Optimized Flexible 
    Policy    Exchange Rate    Exchange. Rate
3 
Standard deviations:          
 consumption    1.25    1.24    1.25 
 output    1.41    1.41    1.39 
 investment    7.35    7.32    7.35 
 inflation rate    0.73    0.50    0.14 
 exchange rate    8.25    0.00    26.11 
          
Stochastic steady state deviations
1:       
 consumption    0.018    0.023    0.030 
 leisure    -0.003    -0.013    -0.020 
 output    0.113    0.123    0.140 
 capital stock    0.513    0.571    0.630 
 interest rate    -8.235    -7.833    -8.560 
 markup ratio    0.360    0.186    0.020 
 net foreign assets    0.000    0.000    0.000 
 trade volume    0.576    0.561    0.570 
          
Unconditional Welfare effects (as percentage of 
steady state consumption)
2: 
 u-overall    -0.659    -0.580    -0.530 
 u-variance    -0.692    -0.674    -0.680 
 u-mean    0.033    0.095    0.150 
            
Conditional Welfare effects (as percentage of 
steady state consumption)
2: 
 u-overall    -0.659    -0.655    -0.636 
 u-variance    -0.692    -0.688    -0.683 
 u-mean    0.033    0.032    0.047 
1 Percent difference between stochastic steady state and deterministic steady state. 
2 Difference between stochastic steady state and deterministic steady state, shown as a share of 
deterministic steady state consumption. 
Foreign variables are identical to home in the cases shown here. 
3 Flexible exchange rate regime with an optimal policy rule ( S Y i i t t t t ˆ 0001 . 0 ˆ 0 . 0 0 . 5 + + + = p ).   26 
Table 4: Asymmetric Asset Market Cases 
 
   No Monetary   Fixed   
Coordinated 
Optimized Flexible  
Foreign Country 
Optimized Flexible 
    Policy   Exchange Rate   Exchange Rate
 3    Exchange Rate
 4 
Standard deviations:                 
 Consumption    1.29    1.29    1.38    1.38 
 Output    1.77    1.78    1.80    1.80 
 Investment    5.89    5.92    5.89    5.89 
 inflation rate    0.64    0.38    0.02    0.02 
 exchange rate    8.58    0.00    11.73    0.00 
                 
Stochastic steady state deviations
1:             
 consumption (home)    0.202    0.092    0.105    0.108 
 consumption (foreign)    -0.187    -0.043    -0.024    -0.027 
 Leisure (home)    -0.539    -0.134    -0.126    -0.135 
 Leisure (foreign)    0.692    0.294    0.285    0.294 
 Output (home)    -0.542    -0.148    -0.114    -0.122 
 Output (foreign)    0.592    0.247    0.264    0.273 
 Capital stock (home)    -0.507    -0.148    -0.073    -0.079 
 Capital stock (foreign)    0.400    0.168    0.230    0.236 
 interest rate     -0.488    -0.216    -0.179    -0.166 
 markup ratio     0.151    0.068    0.002    0.001 
 net foreign assets    78.53    27.41    26.28    27.42 
 trade volume    0.624    0.326    0.320    0.326 
                 
Unconditional Welfare effects (as percentage of steady state consumption)
2:   
 u-overall (home)    0.416    0.013    0.022    0.032 
 u-overall (foreign)    -0.879    -0.438    -0.409    -0.419 
 u-variance    -0.183    -0.178    -0.175    -0.175 
 u-mean (home)    0.599    0.191    0.198    0.207 
 u-mean (foreign)    -0.696    -0.260    -0.234    -0.243 
                 
Conditional Welfare effects (as percentage of steady state consumption)
2:   
 u-overall (home)    0.416    0.441    0.477    0.421 
 u-overall (foreign)    -0.879    -0.863    -0.816    -0.850 
 u-variance    -0.183    -0.174    -0.173    -0.172 
 u-mean (home)    0.599    0.619    0.650    0.593 
 u-mean (foreign)    -0.696    -0.689    -0.644    -0.674 
1 Percent difference between stochastic steady state and deterministic steady state. 
2 Difference between stochastic steady state and deterministic steady state, shown as a share of 
deterministic steady state consumption. 
3 The policy rules are 
4.50.00.0001ˆ ˆ tt t t ii YS p =+++
 for the foreign (sin) country, and 
2.750.00.0001ˆ ˆ tt t t ii YS p =+++
 for the home country 
4 Flexible exchange rate regime with an optimal policy rule for foreign country:  S Y i i t t t t ˆ ˆ 5 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 5 + + + = p , 
home country policy fixed at  S Y i i t t t t ˆ 0001 . 0 ˆ 0 . 0 0 . 5 + + + = p .   27 












The paths are for overall-welfare computed in terms of the change in 
steady state consumption that would have the equivalent effect. 
 
 